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Articles

The Combine and the Common Rule:
Future NFL Players as Unknowing
Research Participants
Christopher R. Deubert*
ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes the application of federal regulations governing
human subjects research to the National Football League (NFL). More
specifically, this Article examines research conducted via the NFL
Scouting Combine. The NFL Combine is an annual event in which
approximately 300 of the best college football players undergo medical
examinations, intelligence tests, interviews, and multiple football and
other athletic drills in the hopes of demonstrating their prowess and
landing a spot in the NFL. Combine participants are under intense pressure
to impress NFL clubs. Indeed, the Combine is routinely called the “biggest
job interview of their lives.”
*Thank you to I. Glenn Cohen, Professor, Harvard Law School, and Faculty Director,
Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology & Bioethics at Harvard Law
School, and Holly Fernandez Lynch, John Russell Dickson, MD Presidential Assistant
Professor of Medical Ethics, Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy at the
University of Pennsylvania Perelman School of Medicine, for helpful comments and
introducing me to the world of human subjects research regulation. All errors are my own.
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The examinations, tests and drills provide a plethora of data for NFL
clubs to analyze in considering which players to select in the NFL Draft.
NFL club medical personnel scour the data on behalf of the clubs, looking
for medical conditions that might affect a player’s short-term or long-term
usefulness to the club. Many of these medical personnel have then also
published studies utilizing the medical data from the NFL Combine. Such
studies can provide a better understanding of the medical conditions faced
by elite football players. At the same time, these studies help clubs predict
how a Combine participant’s medical condition or history might affect his
performance on an NFL field.
Against this backdrop is the field of human subjects research
regulation. Born out of some horrific historical incidents, bioethicists,
doctors, lawyers and related experts constructed a paradigm setting forth
the requirements for research—particularly medical research—involving
humans as subjects. Included in this paradigm are federal regulations,
known as the “Common Rule,” which typically require that research be
reviewed and approved by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) and that
the researchers obtain the participants’ informed consent before
proceeding. Moreover, the Common Rule requires that additional
protections be implemented where the population being researched is
considered “vulnerable.”
This Article examines whether 42 medical studies published using
the medical records and data of NFL Combine participants comply with
the Common Rule and other human subjects research guidelines. Given
the intense pressure to please NFL clubs, and the precariousness of a career
in the NFL, NFL Combine participants have significantly constrained
choices about whether to participate in the research being conducted.
Consequently, it is highly questionable whether informed consent—as
required by the spirit and letter of the Common Rule—is being obtained.
Additionally, given most players’ limited financial resources and the
inequitable power relationship between players and NFL clubs, there is a
strong argument that NFL Combine participants should be considered a
vulnerable research population. This argument is bolstered by similarities
between the workplaces of NFL players and military personnel—a
population regularly recognized as vulnerable.
The Article concludes with five recommendations for better
protecting NFL Combine participants in the context of human subjects
research: (1) requiring researchers and/or the Combine participants to read
the consent form aloud and audio record the process; (2) requiring all
research to be approved by the National Football League Players
Association; (3) requiring consent forms to be provided to the Combine
participants’ agents; (4) having IRBs engage the perspective of a player
when evaluating research; and (5) requiring that Combine participants’
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decision whether or not to participate in the research remain confidential.
By requiring such protections, IRBs have the potential to ensure that NFL
Combine participants are being subjected to research in the dignified and
respectful matter required by the Common Rule.
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INTRODUCTION

Research involving the National Football League (NFL) attracts
public attention, elite universities and professionals, and tens of millions
of dollars. For example, in 2016, the NFL committed $100 million to
research concerning head injuries.1 Similarly, in 2014, the National
Football League Players Association (NFLPA), the players’ union,
committed $56 million to Harvard University for a variety of research
projects related to NFL player health.2
Not surprisingly, the interest in NFL-related research has extended to
players not yet in the NFL. More specifically, there is a considerable—and
growing—body of research utilizing data from the NFL Scouting
Combine, an annual event each February in which approximately three
hundred of the best college football players undergo medical
examinations, intelligence tests, interviews and multiple football and other
athletic drills and tests in the hopes of demonstrating their prowess and
being selected in the NFL Draft.3 Between 2004 and June 2018, there have
been 42 published medical studies utilizing data from the NFL Combine,
17 of which were published in just 2017 and 2018.
These studies—which are listed in Appendix A—analyze a wide
range of medical issues that might affect NFL players, such as anterior
cruciate ligament reconstruction, hip surgery, knee injuries, labral tears,
and spine conditions. Notably, only one of the studies concerns
concussions. The studies are principally concerned with either or both of
two questions: (1) the prevalence of a condition in Combine attendees; and
(2) the effect of such a condition on the player’s performance in the NFL.
Thus, while at least some of this research is designed to improve the
diagnosis and treatment of conditions commonly faced by NFL players, a
substantial portion of the research is clearly designed to better help NFL
clubs evaluate the physical health and injury risks of Draft prospects. This
is not surprising considering that all but one of the studies were coauthored by medical personnel affiliated with NFL clubs.
Nevertheless, medical research is generally highly-regulated.
Research with human participants that is federally funded or which occurs
at an institution that receives federal funds, with some exceptions, “is
1. Ken Belson, N.F.L. to Spend $100 Million to Address Head Trauma, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 14, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2gddYAP.
2. See The Football Players Health Study at Harvard University, FAQs,
https://perma.cc/D9HG-KECK (last visited Mar. 15, 2019) (answering the question of how
the Football Players Health Study at Harvard University was funded). From May 2014 to
May 2017, the author was a part of the Law & Ethics Initiative of the Football Players
Health Study at Harvard University.
3. NFL Scouting Combine, NATIONAL FOOTBALL SCOUTING, http://perma.cc/7ZSSYBSP (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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governed by a set of rules and procedures designed to protect study
participants while enabling the advancement of important biomedical and
social science research.”4 These federal “regulations are formally known
as the Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects and are often
referred to as the ‘Common Rule’ because they are held in common by
many different federal agencies and departments.”5 Since its promulgation
in 1991 and through its amendment in 2017, the Common Rule has stood
as the backbone for ethical research involving human subjects.
This Article raises questions about whether the medical research
coming out of the Combine complies with the Common Rule. In particular,
given the backgrounds of many NFL Combine participants (also referred
to herein simply as “players”) and the pressure to make the NFL, it is
questionable whether NFL Combine participants are providing the type of
meaningful informed consent required by the Common Rule. The authors
of these studies universally declined to provide further information about
the studies, preventing a definitive answer. Consequently, this Article
merely seeks to shed light on this important question, and to suggest
meaningful ways in which researchers—and the institutional regulators
overseeing them—can better ensure that NFL Combine participants are
protected.
***
This Article will proceed in 4 Parts: Part I provides background on
human subjects research regulation and the Common Rule; Part II
provides background on the NFL Combine; Part III examines the
application of the Common Rule to the medical research performed with
NFL Combine data; and, Part IV provides recommendations for better
protecting NFL Combine participants when they become human subjects
research participants. Finally, I conclude with thoughts on the importance
of increased scrutiny to this issue for the purposes of better protecting
future NFL players.
II.

HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH REGULATION

The existing rules and regulations governing human subjects research
in the United States grew out of a series of historical incidents in which
humans were used in research in disturbing and unethical ways. This Part
will provide the historical background on some of those incidents, the
resulting evolution of bioethical consideration of these issues, the
4. Barbara E. Bierer et al., Revised ‘Common Rule’ Shapes Protections For Research
Participants, 36 HEALTH AFFAIRS 784, 784 (2017).
5. Id.
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subsequent enactment of the Common Rule, and the requirements of the
Common Rule today.
A.

Historical Background

There are two particularly important incidents in the history of human
subjects research.
First, during World War II, Nazi doctors and scientists subjected
thousands of prisoners to “painful and often deadly experiments . . .
without their consent.”6 Following the war, 16 Nazi doctors and personnel
were convicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity as part of the
Nuremberg Trials.7 In handing down the convictions, the judges laid out
ten principles that ought to govern medical experiments.8 The first
principle of the list, which came to be known as the Nuremberg Code,
declared that “[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential.”9
Second, between 1932 and 1972, the United States Public Health
Service tracked the health of 399 black men from rural southern
communities who had contracted syphilis.10 However, the doctors
involved with the study (known as the “Tuskegee Study”) did not advise
the men they had the disease, did not treat the disease and discouraged
other doctors from treating the men.11 The study was stopped when its
details were publicly reported and became the subject of widespread
condemnation.12 The United States government later agreed to create a $10
million fund to cover the medical benefits and burial services of all living
research participants, and President Bill Clinton formally apologized for
the study in 1997.13
In 1974, Congress passed the National Research Act which, among
other things, created the National Commission for the Protection of
6. Nazi Medical Experiments, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM,
https://perma.cc/M5RH-Q64M (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
7. Alexander Morgan Capron, Subjects, Participants, and Partners: What Are the
Implications for Research as the Role of Informed Consent Evolves?, in HUMAN SUBJECTS
RESEARCH REGULATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE 143, 143–44 (I. Glenn Cohen &
Holly Fernandez Lynch eds., 2014).
8. Id. at 144.
9. Id. (citing THE NUREMBURG CODE (1947), in Timeline of Laws Related to the
Protection of Human Subjects, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH (Joel Sparks ed., 2002),
https://history.nih.gov/about/timelines/nuremberg.html). As will be discussed below,
modern research ethics recognizes a variety of circumstances in which consent is not
required or can be waived.
10. U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://perma.cc/UE4K-EKS2 (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.14 The
Commission was charged with identifying “the basic ethical principles
that should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral research
involving human subjects and to develop guidelines which should be
followed to assure that such research is conducted in accordance with
those principles.”15 In 1979, the Commission released a lengthy report,
entitled “Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human
Subjects Research,” which came to be known as the Belmont Report.16
The Belmont Report, which specifically referenced the Nazi and
Tuskegee studies, “identified respect for persons, beneficence, and justice
as three basic ethical principles that should underlie the conduct of
biomedical and behavioral research involving human subjects in the
United States.”17 The Belmont Report also explained how these principles
should be applied in research practice by (1) obtaining informed consent,
(2) minimizing risks and ensuring a generally favorable risk-benefit ratio,
and (3) selecting subjects fairly.18 The Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (now known as the Department of Health and Human
Services) subsequently revised its regulations concerning human research
to incorporate the conclusions of the Belmont Report.19
B.

Background on the Common Rule

The Belmont Report’s influence did not end with the Department of
Health and Human Services. In 1991, fourteen additional federal agencies
and departments adopted the same basic regulations “in an effort to
develop uniform and consistent policies for human subjects research
across federal funding bodies.”20 These regulations thus became known as
the “Common Rule.”21 “Today, the Common Rule governs research
conducted or supported by the [sixteen] federal departments and agencies
that have adopted it.”22

14. The Belmont Report, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS. (Apr. 19, 1979),
https://perma.cc/8HYF-3KZX [hereinafter The Belmont Report].
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Amy L. Davis & Elisa A. Hurley, Setting the Stage: The Past and Present of
Human Subjects Research Regulations, in HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH REGULATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE 9, 10–11 (I. Glenn Cohen & Holly Fernandez Lynch eds.,
2014).
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.; Revised Common Rule, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS.,
https://perma.cc/24WF-PWYB (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).

310

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 123:2

After a multi-year process, the Common Rule was amended in
2017,23 with those amendments becoming effective in 2018. According to
experts, the amendments were needed to correct “gaps in protections, on
the one hand, and gross inefficiencies and overregulation, on the other.”24
Modern research involving biospecimens was at least one of the driving
forces behind the amendments,25 and is generally not relevant to the
analysis here.
All of the research examined in this Article was conducted pursuant
to the former version of the Common Rule. Nevertheless, in this Article,
the text from the revised version is generally provided so that the Article
is useful moving forward. Additionally, the majority of the changes to the
relevant provisions were cosmetic and did not fundamentally alter their
purpose or effect. Where meaningful revisions have been made, both the
former and revised versions of the Common Rule’s requirements are
provided.
Some clarifications and definitions also provide important context.
The Common Rule only applies to “research involving human subjects.”26
A “human subject” is defined as “a living individual about whom an
investigator (whether professional or student) conducting research: (i)
Obtains information or biospecimens through intervention or interaction
with the individual, and uses, studies, or analyzes the information or
biospecimens; or (ii) Obtains, uses, studies, analyzes or generates
identifiable private information or identifiable biospecimens.”27
Additionally, research under the Common Rule is broadly defined as “a
systematic investigation, including research development, testing and
evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable
knowledge.”28
Importantly, not all research is the same. A considerable portion of
medical research is obviously devoted to understanding and treating (if not
curing) the world’s most serious diseases, illnesses, and injuries. Of
course, when human subjects are used in such research, they may be
exposed to serious health risks as a result of experimental treatments.
Nevertheless, there is a great deal of research involving human subjects
that is much more benign. The Common Rule defines such research as
“minimal risk,” meaning “that the probability and magnitude of harm or
discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves
than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).
Bierer et al., supra note 4, at 784.
See id. at 785.
45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (West 2018).
45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e)(1) (West 2018).
45 C.F.R. § 46.102(l).
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of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests.”29 Most (if not
all) of the research discussed in this article is likely minimal risk, an
important contextual factor.
Additionally, there are exemptions to the Common Rule,30 including
for “secondary research.”31 Secondary research in the medical field is
research using “existing health data,”32 i.e.¸ data that was not collected for
purposes of the present research. Secondary research data often comes
from existing medical records or samples or data from previous research
studies. Secondary research relevant to this Article consists of one of two
types: (1) research using “publicly available” “identifiable private
information,”33 or (2) research using information that “is recorded by the
investigator in such a manner that the identity of the human subjects
cannot readily be ascertained directly or through identifiers linked to the
subjects, the investigator does not contact the subjects, and the investigator
will not re-identify subjects.”34 As is discussed in Section III.C, this
exemption potentially applies to some of the research involving NFL
Combine participants.
Finally, the Common Rule does not apply to all human subjects
research conducted in the United States. The Common Rule only applies
to research “conducted” or “supported” by the federal departments that
have adopted the Common Rule.35 According to the Office for Human
Research Protections (OHRP), a division of the Department of Health and
Human Services responsible for overseeing human subjects research,36
“federally-supported means the U.S. Government providing any funding
or other support.”37 As part of obtaining federal research funding,

29. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(j).
30. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.104 (West 2018) (listing exemptions to the Common Rule).
31. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4).
32. Barbara J. Evans, Why the Common Rule is Hard to Amend, 10 Ind. Health L. Rev.
365, 378 (2013).
33. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(i).
34. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(ii). The former version of the Common Rule lumped
these exemptions together in a more muddled fashion, defining exempt secondary research
as “[r]esearch . . . involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, records,
pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if these sources are publicly available or
if the information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that subjects cannot be
identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects.” 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4)
(2005) (amended 2018).
35. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (West 2018).
36. About OHRP, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., https://perma.cc/7NYMTPYF (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
37. Federalwide Assurance (FWA) for the Protection of Human Subjects, OFFICE FOR
HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., https://perma.cc/F6PL-VYPZ (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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institutions obtain what is known as a Federalwide Assurance (FWA),
indicating their agreement to comply with the Common Rule.38
While colleges and universities often receive federal funding for
research projects, many research projects are funded internally or by
private donors.39 This distinction creates the possibility that at a particular
university, some of its research will be subject to the Common Rule and
some will not. In order to avoid problems that might arise from having
inconsistent research policies, approximately two-thirds of American
colleges and universities voluntarily agree that all of its non-exempt
human subjects research will comply with the Common Rule.40 This
practice has been known as “checking the box.”41 Historically, in checking
the box, the university was subjecting all of its research—federally and
privately funded—to OHRP’s jurisdiction. However, under the revised
Common Rule, while institutions can still voluntarily apply the Common
Rule to all of their research, OHRP will no longer have jurisdiction over
research that is not federally funded.42
With this background, we can now review the specific requirements
of the Common Rule.
C.

Requirements of the Common Rule

The Common Rule’s principal requirements govern: (1) the
constitution and operations of Institutional Review Boards (IRBs); and,
(2) obtaining informed consent from research participants. Each
requirement is discussed in turn.

38. Id.; see also Assurance Process Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), OFFICE FOR
HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., https://perma.cc/E9J6-LUQF (last visited Mar. 15, 2019)
(answering the question of “What is a Federalwide Assurance (FWA)?,” the OHRP states
that, “[u]nder an FWA, an institution commits to HHS that it will comply with the
requirements set forth in 45 CFR part 46, as well as the Terms of Assurance.”).
39. See Jeffrey Mervis, Data check: U.S. government share of basic research funding
falls below 50%, SCIENCE (Mar. 9, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://perma.cc/P84F-8XDH
(discussing sources of research funding); see also Art Jahnke, Who Picks Up the Tab for
Science?, BU TODAY (Apr. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/FR3V-U6W7.
40. See Harold Blatt et al., When the Assurance comes a ‘Knocking’: OHRP’s FWA
and IRB Registration Processes, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS. (Mar. 28, 2013),
https://perma.cc/5FE2-R248.
41. See id.
42. E-mail from Jaime O. Hernandez, Public Health Advisor, Office for Human
Research Protections, to author (July 20, 2018) (on file with author).
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1. Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)
An IRB is “a group whose function is to review research to assure the
protection of the rights and welfare of the human subjects.”43 IRBs “review
and have authority to approve, require modifications in (to secure
approval), or disapprove all research activities covered by [the Common
Rule].”44
In order for research to be approved under the Common Rule, the
IRB must find that all of the following requirements are satisfied:
(1) Risks to subjects are minimized: (i) By using procedures
which are consistent with sound research design and which
do not unnecessarily expose subjects to risk, and (ii)
whenever appropriate, by using procedures already being
performed on the subjects for diagnostic or treatment
purposes.
(2) Risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated
benefits, if any, to subjects, and the importance of the
knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result. . . .
(3) Selection of subjects is equitable. . . .
(4) Informed consent will be sought from each prospective
subject or the subject’s legally authorized
representative. . . .
(5) Informed consent will be appropriately documented or
appropriately waived. . . .
(6) When appropriate, the research plan makes adequate
provision for monitoring the data collected to ensure the
safety of subjects. . . .
(7) When appropriate, there are adequate provisions to protect
the privacy of subjects and to maintain the confidentiality of
data.45
Additionally, the Common Rule requires that “[w]hen some or all of
the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, such
as children, prisoners, individuals with impaired decision-making
capacity, or economically or educationally disadvantaged persons,
additional safeguards [to] have been included in the study to protect the

43. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Institutional Review Boards Frequently Asked
Questions - Information Sheet, https://perma.cc/G7MX-9J8P (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
44. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a) (West 2018).
45. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1)–(7) (West 2018).
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rights and welfare of these subjects.”46 In Section III.F, we examine
whether NFL Combine participants might be considered a vulnerable
population under the Common Rule.
The Common Rule also contains detailed requirements for the
composition of IRBs:
Each IRB shall have at least five members, with varying backgrounds
to promote complete and adequate review of research activities
commonly conducted by the institution. The IRB shall be sufficiently
qualified through the experience and expertise of its members
(professional competence), and the diversity of the members, including
consideration of race, gender, and cultural backgrounds and sensitivity
to such issues as community attitudes, to promote respect for its advice
and counsel in safeguarding the rights and welfare of human subjects.
The IRB shall be able to ascertain the acceptability of proposed
research in terms of institutional commitments (including policies and
resources) and regulations, applicable law, and standards of
professional conduct and practice. The IRB shall therefore include
persons knowledgeable in these areas. If an IRB regularly reviews
research that involves a vulnerable category of subjects, such as
children, prisoners, individuals with impaired decision-making
capacity, or economically or educationally disadvantaged persons,
consideration shall be given to the inclusion of one or more individuals
who are knowledgeable about and experienced in working with these
subjects.47

Understanding how IRB review works in practice is also important.
Many IRBs have created forms through which researchers address the
requirements of the Common Rule.48 Researchers must also submit
documents that will be used as part of the research, including scripts to be
used to recruit participants and the forms to be used to document the
subject’s consent to the research (if being used).49 The materials will then
be reviewed by the IRB, which frequently requires modifications to be

46. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b).
47. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (West 2018).
48. See generally Creating and Submitting a New Application in ESTR, HARVARD
UNIV., COMM. ON THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS, https://perma.cc/DD9Y-V6DK (last
visited Mar. 15, 2019); see also 6 Tips For Speeding Up The Review of Your Application,
HARVARD UNIV., COMM. ON THE USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS, https://perma.cc/FR5H-AMAZ
(last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
49. See, e.g., id.
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made to the documents before it can be approved.50 Research cannot begin
until all documents are approved by the IRB.51
2. Informed Consent
Informed consent is considered the “ethical cornerstone” and a
“central tenet of biomedical research.”52 The Belmont Report declared that
“[r]espect for persons requires that subjects, to the degree that they are
capable, be given the opportunity to choose what shall or shall not happen
to them.”53 Moreover, the Belmont Report explained that informed
consent generally requires “three elements: information, comprehension
and voluntariness.”54
The former version of the Common Rule codified these principles:
[N]o investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research
covered by this policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally
effective informed consent of the subject or the subject’s legally
authorized representative. An investigator shall seek such consent only
under circumstances that provide the prospective subject or the
representative sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to
participate and that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue
influence. The information that is given to the subject or the
representative shall be in language understandable to the subject or the
representative. No informed consent, whether oral or written, may
include any exculpatory language through which the subject or the
representative is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject’s
legal rights, or releases or appears to release the investigator, the
sponsor, the institution or its agents from liability for negligence.55

The revised Common Rule retains all of the above admonishments,
only in a slightly altered format.56 In addition, the revised Common Rule
provides some additional requirements and guidance:
The prospective subject or the legally authorized representative must
be provided with the information that a reasonable person would want

50. See Steven Joffe, Revolution or Reform in Human Subjects Research Oversight,
40 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 922, 922–23 (2012) (discussing bureaucracy of IRBs); see also
Todd J. Zywicki, Institutional Review Boards as Academic Bureaucracies: An Economic
and Experiential Analysis, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 861, 866–67 (2007).
51. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(h) (West 2018) (“IRB approval means the determination
of the IRB that the research has been reviewed and may be conducted at an institution with
the constraints set forth by the IRB and by other institutional and federal requirements.”).
52. Capron, supra note 7, at 143 (internal citations omitted).
53. The Belmont Report, supra note 14 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2005) (amended 2018).
56. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (West 2018).
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to have in order to make an informed decision about whether to
participate, and an opportunity to discuss that information. . . .
Informed consent must begin with a concise and focused presentation
of the key information that is most likely to assist a prospective subject
or legally authorized representative in understanding the reasons why
one might or might not want to participate in the research. This part of
the informed consent must be organized and presented in a way that
facilitates comprehension.
Informed consent as a whole must present information in sufficient
detail relating to the research, and must be organized and presented in
a way that does not merely provide lists of isolated facts, but rather
facilitates the prospective subject’s or legally authorized
representative’s understanding of the reasons why one might or might
not want to participate.57

The Common Rule outlines the information that must be provided to the
research participant “in seeking informed consent”:
(1) A statement that the study involves research, an explanation of the
purposes of the research and the expected duration of the subject’s
participation, a description of the procedures to be followed, and
identification of any procedures which are experimental;
(2) A description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts
to the subject;
(3) A description of any benefits to the subject or others which may
reasonably be expected from the research;
(4) A disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of
treatment, if any, that might be advantageous to the subject;
(5) A statement describing the extent, if any, to which confidentiality
of records identifying the subject will be maintained;
(6) For research involving more than minimal risk, an explanation as
to whether any compensation and an explanation as to whether
any medical treatments are available if injury occurs and, if so,
what they consist of, or where further information may be
obtained;
(7) An explanation of whom to contact for answers to pertinent
questions about the research and research subjects’ rights, and
57. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(4)–(5) (internal numbering omitted); see also Bierer, supra
note 4, at 785 (“[T]here are still important gaps in the empirical data related to developing,
organizing, and synthesizing what a reasonable person would want to know to make an
informed decision. Questions also remain about how best to assess comprehension of
prospective research participants.”).
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whom to contact in the event of a research-related injury to the
subject; and
(8) A statement that participation is voluntary, refusal to participate
will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is
otherwise entitled, and the subject may discontinue participation
at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject
is otherwise entitled.58

The revised Common Rule added a ninth requirement concerning
secondary research:
(9) One of the following statements about any research that involves
the collection of identifiable private information or identifiable
biospecimens:
(i)

A statement that identifiers might be removed from the
identifiable
private information or
identifiable
biospecimens and that, after such removal, the information
or biospecimens could be used for future research studies
or distributed to another investigator for future research
studies without additional informed consent from the
subject or the legally authorized representative, if this
might be a possibility; or

(ii)

A statement that the subject’s information or biospecimens
collected as part of the research, even if identifiers are
removed, will not be used or distributed for future research
studies.59

This new requirement codifies the practice of “broad consent.”60 Broad
consent permits researchers to use data from one study in future studies
(1) if the data is de-identified, and (2) the research subject is made aware
of this potential future use as part of the initial consent process. The
practice of broad consent is intended to lessen the burdens in conducting
secondary research61 and, as will be discussed below, may have future
applicability in the NFL Combine setting.
The Common Rule also identifies “[a]dditional elements” that might

58. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1)–(8) (2005) (amended 2018).
59. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(9) (West 2018).
60. See generally Mary Bernadette Ott & Gary Yingling, The Common Rule, 1 GUIDE
TO GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE ¶ 1250 (West 2018).
61. See id.
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need to be provided to the research participant in seeking informed
consent:
(1) A statement that the particular treatment or procedure may involve
risks to the subject . . . that are currently unforeseeable;
(2) Anticipated circumstances under which the subject’s participation
may be terminated by the investigator without regard to the
subject’s or the legally authorized representative’s consent;
(3) Any additional costs to the subject that may result from
participation in the research;
(4) The consequences of a subject’s decision to withdraw from the
research and procedures for orderly termination of participation
by the subject;
(5) A statement that significant new findings developed during the
course of the research which may related to the subject’s
willingness to continue participation will be provided to the
subject; and
(6) The approximate number of subjects involved in the study.62

Despite the extensive requirements concerning informed consent, the
Common Rule permits “an IRB to waive or alter consent” if five criteria
are met:
(i)

The research involves no more than minimal risk to the
subjects;

(ii)

The research could not practicably be carried out without the
requested waiver or alteration;

(iii)

If the research involves using identifiable private information
or identifiable biospecimens, the research could not
practicably be carried out without using such information or
biospecimens;

(iv)

The waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights
and welfare of the subjects; and

(v)

Whenever appropriate, the subjects or legally authorized
representatives will be provided with additional pertinent
information after participation.63

62. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(c)(1)–(6) (West 2018). The revised Common Rule added
additional provisions concerning biospecimens and clinical research that are not relevant
here. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(c)(7)–(9).
63. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(f)(3).
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Lastly, as a general rule, the Common Rule requires consent to be
documented with the subject’s signature.64 Additionally, “[t]he
investigator shall give either the subject or the subject’s legally authorized
representative adequate opportunity to read the informed consent form
before it is signed.”65 However, the IRB can waive documentation of
consent if: (i) “the only record linking the subject and the research would
be the consent document and the principal risk would be potential harm
resulting from a breach of confidentiality”; (ii) “the research presents no
more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and involves no procedures for
which written consent is normally required outside of the research
context”; or (iii) “the subjects or legally authorized representatives are
members of a distinct cultural group or community in which signing forms
is not the norm . . . .”66
Importantly, the Common Rule does not say that providing a research
participant with the above information—or having the participant sign a
form indicating they were provided with such information—establishes
informed consent. Indeed, OHRP, in its guidance on the Common Rule,
states that “even if a signed consent form is required, it alone does not
constitute an adequate consent process.”67
Determining when informed consent for purposes of human subjects
research is obtained is not clear. The Common Rule requires “legally
effective informed consent.”68 According to OHRP, “[i]nformed consent
is legally effective if it is both obtained from the subject or the subject’s
legally authorized representative and documented in a manner that is
consistent with the [Common Rule] and with applicable laws of the
jurisdiction in which the research is conducted.”69 While this definition
appears somewhat circular, OHRP’s guidance also states that “[t]he
informed consent process should ensure that all critical information about
a study is completely disclosed, and that prospective subjects or their
legally authorized representatives adequately understand the research so
that they can make informed decisions.”70
The Common Rule provides additional guidance by indicating that
informed consent requires investigators to “minimize the possibility of
coercion or undue influence.”71 Nevertheless, this requirement raises the
64. 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(a) (West 2018).
65. 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(b)(1).
66. 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(c)(1).
67. Informed Consent FAQs, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS.,
https://perma.cc/99A8-8JMT (last visited Mar. 15, 2019) [hereinafter Informed Consent
FAQs].
68. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1) (West 2018).
69. Informed Consent FAQs, supra note 67.
70. Id.
71. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2).
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question of the meanings of coercion and undue influence in the human
subjects research context.
a. Defining Coercion and Undue Influence
The Common Rule does not define coercion or undue influence but
nevertheless, there is guidance on the issue. The Belmont Report states
that:
An agreement to participate in research constitutes a valid consent only
if voluntarily given. This element of informed consent requires
conditions free of coercion and undue influence. Coercion occurs
when an overt threat of harm is intentionally presented by one person
to another in order to obtain compliance. Undue influence, by
contrast, occurs through an offer of an excessive, unwarranted,
inappropriate or improper reward or other overture in order to obtain
compliance. Also, inducements that would ordinarily be acceptable
may become undue influences if the subject is especially vulnerable.72

In responding to the frequently asked question “What does it mean to
minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence?”, OHRP’s
guidance is nearly identical to that of the Belmont Report’s.73 One key
distinction is that OHRP’s guidance states that coercion can also occur
through an “implicit” threat of harm.74 This additional language might be
important, as discussed in Section III.E.
While some IRB members might conflate the two terms,75 coercion
and undue influence should be thought of as distinct concepts.76 Generally
speaking, coercion occurs where the potential participant faces a “worse
consequence,” while undue influence occurs where the potential
participant is being offered a “positive good.”77
When coercion or undue influence has taken place is still an unclear
issue. Research has not revealed any case decisions on the matter and
OHRP’s database of “determinations of noncompliance”78 also does not
provide any helpful guidance. While the database does include a variety

72. The Belmont Report, supra note 14 (emphasis added).
73. See Informed Consent FAQs, supra note 67.
74. Id.
75. See Emily A. Largent & Holly F. Lynch, Paying Research Participants:
Regulatory Uncertainty, Conceptual Confusion, and a Path Forward, 17 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 61, 115 (2017) (detailing survey conducted of IRB members and their
understanding of the terms “coercion” and “undue influence”).
76. See id.
77. See id. at 112 (quoting Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Ending Concerns About Undue
Inducement, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 100, 101 (2004)).
78. OHRP Determination Letters and Other Correspondence, OFFICE FOR HUMAN
RESEARCH PROTS., https://perma.cc/47GP-LYUP (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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of letters to various institutions concerning informed consent in particular
research studies, OHRP’s responses merely express a general concern that
all of the enumerated elements of informed consent required by the
Common Rule have been established.79
Without specific guidance or findings in the ethical and regulatory
fields, state law might provide another useful avenue for examining
compliance with the Common Rule. As stated above, the informed consent
process must also comply with the law of the state in which the research
is being conducted.80 There is a large body of case law on coercion and
undue influence within each state’s jurisprudence, particularly on issues
concerning criminal law,81 contracts82 and wills and estates.83 On this
front, the Restatements of Law from the American Law Institute, which
seek to summarize general principles of law, are a helpful generalization
of state laws.
Multiple Restatements of Law categorize coercion as a synonym for
“duress.”84 According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, duress
occurs where: (1) “a person physically compels conduct that appears to be
a manifestation of assent by a party who has no intention of engaging in
that conduct”; or, (2) “a person makes an improper threat that induces a

79. See, e.g., Letter from Kristina C. Borror, Director, Division of Compliance
Oversight, Office for Human Research Protections, to Harry W. Orf, Senior Vice President
for Research, Massachusetts General Hospital (Oct. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/Q7MSVJEG; Letter from Kristina C. Borror, Director, Division of Compliance Oversight, Office
for Human Research Protections, to Stephen Welter, Vice-President for Research, San
Diego State University (Feb. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/BKK9-X55Z.
80. See Informed Consent FAQs, supra note 67 (“Informed consent is legally effective
if it is both obtained from the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative and
documented in a manner that is consistent with the [Common Rule] and with applicable
laws of the jurisdiction in which the research is conducted.”) (emphasis added); 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.116(i) (West 2018) (“The informed consent requirements in [the Common Rule] are
not intended to preempt any applicable federal, state, or local laws which require additional
information to be disclosed in order to for informed consent to be legally effective.”).
81. See, e.g., People v. Case, 418 P.3d 360, 379–80 (Cal. 2018) (examining whether
criminal defendant’s statements were coerced); People v. Zadran, 314 P.3d 830, 833–35
(Colo. 2013) (same); State v. Garcia, 743 A.2d 1038, 1044–47 (R.I. 2000) (examining
whether witnesses’ statements were coerced).
82. See, e.g., Gelber v. Glock, 800 S.E.2d 800, 815–18 (Va. 2017) (examining whether
to set aside a contract for undue influence); Albert v. Albert, 108 A.3d 388, 392–93 (Me.
2015) (same).
83. See, e.g., Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 418–21 (Tex. 2017) (examining
whether trust was amended before death as a result of undue influence); Williams v.
Hubbard, 455 S.W.3d 426, 433–39 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (examining whether decedent’s
nonprobate transfers resulted from undue influence).
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT Index C100
(AM. LAW INST. 2018) (instructing reader to “See DURESS”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS Index C360 (AM. LAW INST. 2018)
(same); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS Index C190 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (same).
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party who has no reasonable alternative to manifesting his assent.”85 In the
first case, no enforceable contract can be created, while in the second, the
contract is voidable at the victim’s discretion.86 The wrongful conduct can
be implied.87
On undue influence, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states
that:
Undue influence involves unfair persuasion, a milder form of pressure
than duress. Such persuasion nevertheless makes the contract voidable
if it is exercised on a party who is under the domination of the person
exercising it or is, by virtue of his relation with that person, justified in
assuming that this person will not act in a manner inconsistent with his
welfare.88

Finally, an additional persuasive authority on the definitions of
coercion and undue influence under state law is Black’s Law Dictionary,
the leading legal dictionary. Black’s defines coercion as “[c]ompulsion of
a free agent by physical, moral, or economic force or threat of physical
force”89 and undue influence as “[t]he improper use of power or trust in a
way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another’s objective;
the exercise of enough control over another person that a questioned act
by this person would not have otherwise been performed, the person’s free
agency having been overmastered.”90
The definitions used by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and
Black’s Law Dictionary differ slightly from those of the Belmont Report
and OHRP. This is important for the fact that conduct that might not rise
to the level of illegality, might still be ethically problematic. Nevertheless,
because research governed by the Common Rule must comply with both
the Common Rule and state law, these definitions should only expand the
type of conduct that could be considered in violation of the Common Rule.

85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 7, topic 2, intro. note (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
86. See id.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. a (AM LAW INST. 1981) (“[I]f
one person strikes or imprisons another, the conduct may amount to duress because of the
threat of further blows or continued imprisonment that is implied.”); see also King v.
Donnkenny, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738–40 (W.D. Va. 2000); Comcast of Oregon II, Inc.
v. City of Eugene, 155 P.3d 99, 107 (Or. Ct. App. 2007); State Nat’l Bank v. Farah Mfg.
Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 685 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch.7, topic 2, intro. note (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
89. Coercion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
90. Undue Influence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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Ultimately, determining whether informed consent has been
obtained, taking into account the factors mentioned in these definitions, is
the IRB’s responsibility.91
***
With the above understanding of the Common Rule’s requirements,
background on the NFL Combine is provided, before analyzing the two
together.
III.

THE NFL COMBINE

The NFL Combine is an annual event each February in which
approximately three hundred of the best college football players undergo
medical examinations, intelligence tests, interviews and multiple football
and other athletic drills and tests in the hopes of demonstrating their
prowess and landing a spot in the NFL.92 Although called the NFL
Combine, the event is technically organized by National Invitational
Camp, Inc., the legal entity that is the Combine,93 a subsidiary of National
Football Scouting, Inc. National Football Scouting is an organization that
provides scouting services to NFL clubs and which is owned and managed
as a joint endeavor by 20 of the NFL’s 32 clubs.94 Nevertheless, the NFL
exercises considerable control over the Combine, including helping to
make decisions about the drills that players perform, selling public tickets,
and broadcasting the event on television.95
The importance of the Combine to its participants cannot be
understated—it is routinely called the “biggest job interview of their
lives.”96 NFL club executives, coaches, scouts, doctors and athletic
trainers attend the Combine to evaluate the players for the upcoming NFL
91. See Informed Consent FAQs, supra note 67 (“It is up to the IRB to use its
discretion in determining which circumstances give rise to undue influence. . . . IRBs must
be vigilant about minimizing the possibility for coercion and undue influence.”).
92. NFL SCOUTING COMBINE, http://www.nflcombine.net/ (last visited Mar. 15,
2019).
93. See Bill Bradley, Jeff Foster Talks About Challenges of Hosting NFL Scouting
Combine, NFL.COM (Feb. 18, 2014, 2:53 PM), https://perma.cc/JEX3-FY3H [hereinafter
Bradley, Jeff Foster] (discussing National Football Scouting, Inc.’s operation of the NFL
Combine).
94. Bill Bradley, Too much overlap caused NFL to create annual Scouting Combine,
NFL.COM (Feb. 17, 2014, 2:27 PM), https://perma.cc/FH4X-XZK8.
95. Albert Breer, NFL Scouting Combine’s evolution raises questions about future,
NFL.COM (Feb. 18, 2013, 12:17 PM), https://perma.cc/579Q-6Y2N.
96. See Ali Bhanpuri et al., The Ultimate Interview: Preparing for the NFL Scouting
Combine, NFL.com, http://www.nfl.com/combinestories (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); see
also Keiana Martin, NFL Scouting Combine 101: What You Need to Know, CHIEFS.COM
(Feb. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/EZ7H-94A7.
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Draft (usually in April).97 In the 2016 NFL Draft, 83.6% of players that
were drafted participated at the NFL Combine.98 And, of those draftees
that were not invited to the Combine, none were selected before the 4th
round of the Draft.99 One of the most important parts of the Combine are
the 15 minute interviews in which club executives and coaches question
players about football, but also their personal lives and a wide variety of
other topics.100 The players are undoubtedly under immense pressure to
impress the clubs during the multi-day Combine.101
While the interviews are critical, according to Jeff Foster, the
President of National Football Scouting, all 32 NFL clubs consider the
medical exams (and not the athletic drills or interviews) to be the most
important part of the Combine.102 Since 1987, doctors with IU Health,103 a
healthcare system affiliated with Indiana University School of Medicine,
perform x-rays, MRIs and other exams at each year’s Combine.104 The IU
Health examinations are performed on behalf of the Combine, who then
provides the results to NFL clubs. After the examinations performed by
IU Health doctors, club doctors also examine the participants. The medical
examinations at the Combine generally include x-rays, MRIs,
echocardiograms, and blood analysis.105 Participants must also take a drug
test.106 Dr. Richard Kovacs, a cardiologist with IU Health describes the

97. See NFL SCOUTING COMBINE, supra note 92.
98. See Notable current NFL players who weren’t invited to the combine, NFL.COM
(Feb. 6, 2018, 12:39 PM), https://perma.cc/DML9-8SMX.
99. See id.
100. See Jenny Vrentas, Behind Closed Doors at the NFL Combine, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/PL8G-CNWG; see also Rodger Sherman,
The Weirdest, Dumbest Questions NFL Teams Ask Players at the Combine,
SBNATION.COM (Feb. 25, 2016, 4:29 PM), https://perma.cc/YC9U-QDT8.
101. See id.
102. See Breer, supra note 95.
103. See Bradley, Jeff Foster, supra note 93.
104. See id. (describing IU doctors as “handl[ing] all of the testing, imaging and
reporting of the standard and special battery of tests that we do on each athlete”); see also
Breer, supra note 95 (describing IU doctors as having been “a combine partner for 28
years,” and noting that “350 MRIs were conducted on 330 players in a four-day period,
with IU Health”); see also About IU Health, IND. U. HEALTH, https://iuhealth.org/aboutour-system (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
105. See Shalise Manza Young, Healthy status: Lotulelei at top after heart scare, BOS.
GLOBE, Apr. 19, 2013, 2013 WLNR 9554561; see also Jarrett Bell, NFL Combine: All the
Buzz, USA TODAY, Feb. 28, 2005, 2005 WLNR 3112818; see also Mike Chappell, NFL’s
health assurance plan, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 19, 2004, 2004 WLNR 23116329.
106. See Matt Bowen, McClellin’s shift to LB, plus fresh talent have potential to help
defense, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2014, 2014 WLNR 16913612 (discussing player’s failed drug
test at Combine); see also Ralph Vacchiano, NY Giants cornerback Jayron Hosley gets
four-game suspension for violating NFL’s drug policy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 5, 2014),
https://perma.cc/U64B-K6AN (same).
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medical exams as “the choke point, . . . [n]o one goes to [the Combine]
until they go through us.”107
In a 2017 University of Pennsylvania Law Review article, my coauthors and I explained the ways in which the medical exams at the NFL
Combine likely violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).108 The
ADA prohibits pre-employment medical exams.109 As discussed above,
the NFL Combine is principally a forum for pre-employment medical
exams of prospective NFL players. Despite their apparent violation of the
law, the medical exams at the Combine have existed for decades and
continue to exist.
To facilitate these examinations and the exchange of medical
information that takes place, participants in the Combine are requested to
sign two documents: (1) an authorization for the use and disclosure of
records and information; and, (2) an authorization for release and
disclosure of medical and mental health records.110
The authorization for use and disclosure of records and information
form permits a wide range of individuals and entities to use, release and
disclose a player’s medical records, including but not limited to the
Combine, the NFL, all NFL clubs, NFL club medical staff, and various
NFL health-related consultants. Similarly, the authorization for the release
and disclosure of medical and mental health records authorizes any entity
that possess a player’s medical records, including healthcare providers,
schools and others, to release those records to the Combine, the NFL, all
NFL clubs, NFL club medical staff, and various NFL health-related
consultants.111 As discussed at the outset, many of the authors of the
research studies at issue were NFL club medical staff and thus, under these
documents, were authorized to receive and use player medical
information.
As a practical matter, players sign the authorizations as requested. If
a player refused to sign the authorization, a club might lack medical
information essential in considering whether to draft the player, potentially
preventing the player from being drafted at all. Additionally, the player
107. Dana Hunsinger Benbow, The real reason for the NFL Scouting Combine,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Feb. 25, 2016, 9:06 AM), https://perma.cc/4WU7-ZKVM.
108. See Jessica L. Roberts, I. Glenn Cohen, Christopher R. Deubert & Holly
Fernandez Lynch, Evaluating NFL Player Health and Performance: Legal and Ethical
Issues, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 263–64 (2017).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(B) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
110. See Roberts et al., supra note 108, online apps. B, C.
111. The authorization forms may also raise concerns as to compliance with the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). For more on HIPAA and the NFL,
see CHRISTOPHER R. DEUBERT ET AL., PROTECTING AND PROMOTING THE HEALTH OF NFL
PLAYERS: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, THE FOOTBALL
PLAYERS HEALTH STUDY AT HARVARD UNIV. 102–03 (2016), https://perma.cc/2G2XNL4R.
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does not want to risk angering the NFL or a club by refusing to sign, which
would also threaten his Draft status. As a result, players, throughout their
NFL careers, routinely sign such authorizations or waivers when
requested.112
There is an additionally relevant point about the nature of the
authorization forms. Both of the authorizations state that they were
“collectively bargained for by the National Football League and the
National Football League Players Association [NFLPA],” the players’
labor union. However, the NFLPA has no authority to collectively bargain
on behalf of Combine participants because the Combine participants are
not yet part of the bargaining unit represented by the NFLPA. As stated in
the NFL-NFLPA collective bargaining agreement (CBA), the bargaining
unit consists of:
(1) All professional football players employed by a member club of the
National Football League; (2) All professional football players who
have been previously employed by a member club of the National
Football League who are seeking employment with an NFL Club;
(3) All rookie players once they are selected in the current year’s NFL
College Draft; and (4) all undrafted rookie players once they
commence negotiation with an NFL Club concerning employment as
a player.113

Combine participants do not fit into any of these categories, and thus, the
fact that the NFLPA agreed to the authorization forms has no legal effect.
Finally, clarifying the role of these authorization forms as they relate
to studies governed by (and thus not exempt from) the Common Rule is
important. While these forms permit the broad disclosure and use of player
medical information, they cannot be used to justify the use of player
medical information in medical studies as they do not meet the
requirements of the Common Rule. For example, they do not include the
information generally required as part of seeking informed consent, such
as an explanation of the research,114 a description of any reasonably
foreseeable risks or discomforts,115 or a description of any benefits to the
subject or others which may reasonably be expected from the research,116
among others.117 Thus, if studies utilizing data gathered from the NFL
Combine are subject to the Common Rule (as will be analyzed below),
112. Id. at 99 n.k.
113. See NFL-NFLPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT pmbl. (2011),
https://perma.cc/M8S9-UAVH [hereinafter NFL-NFLPA CBA].
114. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(1) (West 2018).
115. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2).
116. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(3).
117. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (listing the information that must be provided to the
research participant “in seeking informed consent”).
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they must use their own forms in gaining players’ informed consent (or
otherwise obtain permission to waive consent), an issue discussed in
Section III.E below.
***
With an understanding of the NFL Combine, this article moves on
to examine the research that has been conducted via the NFL Combine,
and applying human subjects research regulations to this research.
IV.

APPLYING HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH REGULATIONS TO
RESEARCH CONDUCTED VIA THE NFL COMBINE

By searching PubMed, an online database of biomedical publications
maintained by the United States National Library of Medicine at the
National Institutes of Health,118 I identified 42 studies that have been
published using medical data gathered at the NFL Combine. A list of these
studies is included as Appendix A.
The studies variably provide information relevant to analyzing their
compliance with the Common Rule. In an attempt to gain more
information, I emailed at least one co-author of all 42 studies. As some
doctors were co-authors of several studies, in total I contacted 14
doctors.119 I emailed the doctors a total of three times each during the
summer of 2018. No doctors provided a substantive response.
The doctors’ failure to respond limits the analysis. Nevertheless,
using the information provided in the studies, this Part examines the
studies through the lens of the Common Rule. More specifically, I
consider: (a) whether the studies are “research” as defined by the Common
Rule; (b) whether the research is governed by the Common Rule; (c)
whether the research is exempt from the Common Rule; (d) whether an
IRB approved the research; (e) whether informed consent could have been
waived; (f) whether informed consent was obtained; and (g) whether NFL
118. See PubMed Help, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOETHICAL INFO. (Oct. 22, 2018),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK3827/#pubmedhelp.FAQs.
119. Specifically, I contacted: Matthew T. Provencher (co-author of studies 1, 3, 5, 6,
8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16 in Appendix A); Derrick M. Knapik (studies 2, 7, 10, 14, and
17); Brian J. Rebolledo (study 4); Daniel Gibbs (studies 18, 19, 20, and 21); Gary Solomon
(study 22); Chris Brown (study 23); Gary Kiebzak (studies 24 and 25); Dominic Carreira
(study 26); Chris Larson (study 27); Robert Brophy (studies 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38,
and 39); Lee Kaplan (studies 31, 37, and 40); Kurt Hirshorn (study 34); Jon E. Browne
(study 41); Helene Pavlov (study 42); and Russell F. Warren (study 42). I asked the doctors:
(1) Was informed consent obtained from the NFL Combine participants? (a) If so, can you
please briefly describe the process for obtaining consent or provide me with a copy of the
consent form? (b) If informed consent was not obtained, why not? (2) Was the medial data
you analyzed de-identified? (3) Did any players decline to participate in the study?
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Combine participants should be considered a vulnerable research
population.
A.

Is it Research?

As an initial matter, research is only subject to the Common Rule if
it fits within the definition of research as defined by the Common Rule.120
As mentioned earlier, the Common Rule defines research as “a systematic
investigation, including research development, testing, and evaluation,
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.”121 The
medical studies discussed in this Article are a classic type of research
contemplated by the Common Rule.122 The studies do not concern the
treatment of an individual patient, but are instead designed to “test an
hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop or
contribute to generalizable knowledge”123 in the field through publication.
Indeed, the American Journal of Sports Medicine, the journal in
which 12 of the studies have been published, states that “[t]he journal acts
as an important forum for independent orthopaedic sports medicine
research and education, allowing clinical practitioners the ability to make
decisions based on sound scientific information.”124 For example, in a
2010 article in the journal utilizing medical data from the Combine, the
researchers concluded that “[a] history of shoulder stabilization shortens
the expected career of a professional football player, particularly for
linemen and linebackers. Further research is warranted to better
understand how these injuries and surgeries affect an athlete’s career and
what can be done to improve the long-term outcome after treatment.”125
This article contributed to the “generalizable knowledge” of NFL clubs
and their medical personnel, particularly in the Draft analyses. There is
thus little doubt that the studies published using medical data gathered at
the NFL Combine are research within the meaning of the Common Rule.

120. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (West 2018) (“[T]his policy applies to all research
involving human subjects conducted, supported, or otherwise subject to regulation by any
Federal department or agency that takes appropriate administrative action to make the
policy applicable to such research.”) (emphasis added).
121. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (West 2018).
122. See BARUCH A. BRODY, THE ETHICS OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 37–
38 (1998).
123. See id. (quoting The Belmont Report, supra note 14, and discussing what
constitutes “research”).
124. See The American Journal of Sports Medicine¸ SAGE PUBLISHING,
https://bit.ly/2ODScWO (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
125. Robert H. Brophy et al., Effect of Shoulder Stabilization on Career Length in
National Football League Athletes, 39 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 704, 704 (2010).
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Is the Research Governed by the Common Rule?

As explained in Section I.B, the Common Rule has historically only
governed research supported by the federal government or that is being
conducted at an institution that has agreed that all of its research will
comply with the Common Rule, i.e., “checking the box,” via an FWA.
None of the studies indicate that they were supported by the federal
government. Thus, the Combine studies are only subject to the Common
Rule if one or more of the investigators worked at an institution that
provided an FWA and “checked the box.”
By searching OHRP’s database of approved FWAs,126 I determined
that all 42 of the studies utilizing medical data collected at the NFL
Combine were conducted by at least one medical professional that worked
at an institution that currently has an FWA, indicating that the institution
has likely sought federal research funding and thus agreed to comply with
the Common Rule as a result.
Nevertheless, information on whether an institution checked the box
is not publicly available.127 Thus, it cannot be said with certainty that all
of the research was being conducted by at least one institution that checked
the box, and therefore, voluntarily agreed to comply with the Common
Rule. However, as noted above, approximately two-thirds of American
colleges and universities did previously check the box.128 Moreover, given
that the vast majority of the researchers worked at large, national
universities and/or medical centers, it seems likely that most (if not all) of
the research discussed herein was subject to the Common Rule.
C.

Is the Research Exempt from the Common Rule?

As discussed in Section III.B, some secondary research is exempt
from the Common Rule.129 Secondary research relevant to this Article
consists of one of two types: (1) research using “publicly available”
“identifiable private information,”130 or (2) research using information that
“is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that the identity of the
human subjects cannot readily be ascertained directly or through
identifiers linked to the subjects, the investigator does not contact the
subjects, and the investigator will not re-identify subjects.”131
126. See Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) Database for Registered
IORGs & IRBs, Approved FWAs, and Documents Received in Last 60 Days, OFFICE FOR
HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., https://bit.ly/2yCK7rj (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
127. E-mail from Jaime O. Hernandez, supra note 42.
128. See Blatt et al., supra note 40.
129. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b) (West 2018) (listing exemptions to the Common Rule).
130. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(i) (West 2018).
131. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(ii).
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The secondary research exemption thus requires us to consider three
questions. First, did the data studied exist prior to the study? If the answer
is “no,” then the study is not secondary research and is thus not exempt
from the Common Rule under the secondary research exemption. If the
answer is “yes,” then we must turn to the second question—is the data
publicly available? If the answer is “yes,” then the study is exempt from
the Common Rule. If the answer is “no,” we turn to the third question—
was the data recorded and maintained in a de-identified manner? If the
answer is “yes,” then the study is exempt from the Common Rule. But if
the answer is “no,” the study must comply with the Common Rule.
The answer to the first question is “yes.” A review of the studies at
hand shows that all 42 studies relied on pre-existing data.132 Specifically,
all of the studies relied largely on the medical information collected by
doctors and athletic trainers working at the Combine. In 2012, the NFL
clubs and the Combine instituted a “fully digitized” system of player
medical records, making review and research much easier.133 Since that
time, several studies have referenced having “obtained [data] from the
database organized by the NFL medical personnel for compilation of the
medical and physical performance examination results of [players]
participating in the NFL Combine.”134 Since the studies are relying on preexisting data, they are secondary research potentially exempt from the
Common Rule, requiring consideration of the second question.
The answer to the second question—whether the player medical data
collected at the NFL Combine is publicly available—is “no.” As a general
rule, the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) and certain states’ laws require healthcare providers covered by
the law to obtain an individual’s authorization before disclosing health
information.135 While the Combine participants execute broad waivers that
permit their medical information to be shared with the NFL, NFL clubs
132. See infra Appendix A.
133. Derrick M. Knapik et al., Recurrent Labral Tearing on Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Is Not Predictive of Diminished Participation Among National Football League
Athletes, 34 ARTHROSCOPY 66, 67 (2018).
134. Catherine A. Logan et al., Posterior Cruciate Ligament Injuries of the Knee at the
National Football League Combine: An Imaging and Epidemiology Study, 34
ARTHROSCOPY 681, 682 (2018); see also Jorge Chahla et al., Posterolateral Corner Injuries
of the Knee at the National Football League Combine: An Imaging and Outcomes Analysis,
34 ARTHROSCOPY 687, 688 (2018); Leigh-Anne Tu et al., Prevalence of Jones Fracture
Repair and Impact on Short-Term NFL Participation, 39 FOOT & ANKLE INT’L 6, 7 (2018)
(referencing having obtained data from “the NFL Combine database”).
135. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (West 2018) (“A covered entity or business associate
may not use or disclose protected health information, except as permitted or required by
[other law].”). See generally Morgan Leigh Tendam, The HIPAA-POTA-Mess: How
HIPAA’s Weak Enforcement Standards Have Led States to Create Confusing Medical
Privacy Remedies, 79 OHIO ST. L. J. 411, 425-26 (2018).
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and related parties,136 the waivers do not permit the disclosure of their
medical information to the general public.137
With the second question answered in the negative, the studies can
only be exempt from the Common Rule as secondary research if the data
“is recorded by the investigator in such a manner that the identity of the
human subjects cannot readily be ascertained directly or through
identifiers linked to the subjects, the investigator does not contact the
subjects, and the investigator will not re-identify subjects.”138 This is
where the analysis gets more challenging and uncertain.
As an initial matter, medical data about Combine participants is
certainly collected in an identifiable manner in the first instance—the
entire purpose of the medical examinations at the Combine is to
understand specific players’ medical conditions as part of the clubs’
evaluations of the players. From there, none of the studies in Appendix A
mentions any efforts to record the data for their studies in a de-identified
manner, though that is not generally information included in a research
article.
Understanding the studies discussed is helpful in analyzing this issue.
Twenty-four of the studies analyzed the NFL performance of Combine
participants whose Combine medical records revealed certain medical
conditions.139 These studies necessarily involved creating a database of
players with the medical condition being examined and then inputting the
NFL playing statistics of those players. It is challenging—but not
impossible—to imagine that the researchers recorded their study data—as
opposed to the Combine’s database—in a de-identified manner. To do so,
the researchers seemingly would have had to: (1) have had access to player
medical records in an identified form; (2) not copy or record those medical
records in an identified form; (3) use that access to count the number of
players with the condition and their position (or other information relevant
to the study) but without recording their identity; (4) also use that access
to find the players with the condition without recording their identity; and
(5) then record those players’ statistics without also recording their
identity. This process is burdensome and seems prone to mistake,
particularly if the statistical analysis is being done prospectively or
contemporaneously with the player’s NFL career. It seems more likely that
the researchers: (1) examined player medical records through the NFL
Combine’s database; (2) identified those players with the medical
136. See PRITTS supra note 112 and accompanying text.
137. By comparison, once in the League, players do execute waivers permitting public
disclosure of their medical information for, among other things, NFL injury reports. See
DEUBERT ET AL., supra note 111, at 17.
138. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(ii) (West 2018).
139. See infra Appendix A, studies 1–3, 6–10, 12–21, 25–26, 32–33, 35–36, 38.
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condition at issue; (3) created a new database of those afflicted players;
and (4) inserted and analyzed the statistical performance of those players.
Moreover, there are certain factors that would also make deidentification challenging for these performance studies. Ten of the studies
had study populations of less than 50 players.140 When you begin including
those players’ years played, positions, and statistics, it would seem that at
least some of them could be easily identified by looking at NFL.com’s
database of player statistics. For example, a hypothetical 2015 Combine
attendee who suffered a torn ACL in college, plays wide receiver, and
scored 4 touchdowns in his rookie year would likely be a population of
very few. Nevertheless, none of the studies described their processes in a
level of detail sufficient to definitively state whether or not they were using
de-identified data.
In addition to the performance studies, two studies analyzed whether
players with certain medical conditions were drafted.141 These studies
would likely have gone through one of the processes described above to
collect their data. Nevertheless, without the additional component of
examining multiple years of NFL player statistics, these studies might be
more amenable to de-identified recording.
Removing the 26 performance and draftee studies discussed above
leaves 16 other studies to consider. These studies are varied but many
concern the prevalence of a condition142 or the success of prior treatments
of various conditions143 among the NFL Combine participant population.
These studies could have fairly easily recorded their study data in a deidentified manner depending on the manner in which the NFL Combine
player data was initially stored. With the advent of the NFL Combine’s
digital medical records system, it seems likely that a player’s name and
other identifying information (such as position, college, hometown, etc.)
could be removed as necessary. Nevertheless, as will be elaborated on
below, 10 of these 16 studies144 mention having received IRB approval—
suggesting the authors did not believe their studies were exempt from the
Common Rule.
In sum, whether the studies discussed in this Article are exempt from
the Common Rule is unclear. At the same time, there are various pieces of
evidence that suggest many of them are not. If the studies are not exempt,
the Common Rule requires their approval by an IRB.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See infra Appendix A, studies 2, 7–8, 12–14, 16, 18–19, 32.
See infra Appendix A, studies 3, 27.
See infra Appendix A, studies 5, 23, 30, 34, 39–42.
See infra Appendix A, studies 11, 28–29.
See infra Appendix A, studies 4–5, 22, 24, 29–30, 34, 37, 39–40.
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Was IRB Approval Obtained?

Assuming the studies are subject to the Common Rule—as it seems
most are—we can now turn to examining whether the studies complied
with the Common Rule. The first part of this analysis is evaluating whether
the studies were approved by an IRB, as required by the Common Rule for
non-exempt research.145 Twenty-seven of the 42 studies specifically
reference IRB approval.146 Thus, while it is possible that some of the
studies did not obtain IRB approval, it is unlikely. As explained above, the
studies were generally conducted by highly-qualified medical
professionals affiliated with respected universities and medical
institutions. IRBs are a fact of life in academic medicine and there is no
reason to think these studies were handled any differently.
E.

Could Informed Consent Have Been Waived?

As discussed in Section 1.C.2, informed consent is an important
requirement of the Common Rule. Nevertheless, as also discussed in that
Section, informed consent can be waived if five criteria are met:
(i)

The research involves no more than minimal risk to the
subjects;

(ii)

The research could not practicably be carried out without the
requested waiver or alteration;

(iii)

If the research involves using identifiable private information
or identifiable biospecimens, the research could not
practicably be carried out without using such information or
biospecimens;

(iv)

The waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights
and welfare of the subjects; and

(v)

Whenever appropriate, the subjects or legally authorized
representatives will be provided with additional pertinent
information after participation.147

Some of the studies possibly met the criteria to waive consent.
First, most (if not all) of the studies are minimal risk. “Minimal risk
means that the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort
anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those
145. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a) (West 2018) (“An IRB shall review and have authority to
approve, require modifications in (to secure approval), or disapprove all research activities
covered by this policy.”).
146. See infra Appendix A, studies 1-10, 12-17, 22, 24, 25, 29-31, 33-34, 37, 39, 40.
147. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(f)(3) (West 2018).
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ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine
physical or psychological examinations or tests.”148 Generally speaking,
none of the studies involved medical interventions and all of the medical
data came from exams that the players were already undergoing as part of
the NFL Combine. The players did not suffer any medical harm or
discomfort from the studies.
Second, consent could have been impractical for some of the studies.
For studies that used data from multiple years ago, it would have been
extremely challenging to track down hundreds or thousands of former
NFL Combine participants and ask for their consent to the research. But
for studies that began on or around the same year for which data was
analyzed, the researchers could have sought the participants’ consent at
the Combine.
Third, which studies could or could not have been conducted without
using identifiable private information is questionable. As discussed in
Section III.C, determining which of the research might have been able to,
as a practical matter, successfully record their study data in a de-identified
manner is challenging.
Fourth, there is a strong argument that waiver of consent could
adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects. As discussed above,
most of the studies are aimed at understanding how a player’s medical
condition might affect his performance in the NFL. If a study revealed that
players with a certain knee condition were statistically less successful than
comparable players without the knee condition, the players with the knee
condition would likely have serious reservations about participating in
such a study. It would not make sense for a player to voluntarily participate
in a study that decreased his Draft status and prospects in the NFL.
Fifth, the studies likely did not provide the subjects with additional
information after participation. Indeed, for reasons discussed below, it
seems unlikely players have any idea this research is occurring. Moreover,
providing the NFLPA with additional information is also not sufficient.
As discussed in Section II, the NFLPA does not represent Combine
participants because the participants are not yet within the NFLPA’s
bargaining unit and thus the NFLPA would not qualify as a legally
authorized representative.
In sum, while some of the studies might have met the criteria to waive
consent, in general the sum of the factors weighs against waiver.

148. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(j) (West 2018).
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Was Informed Consent Obtained?

Assuming informed consent could not be waived, whether the
Combine participants are providing informed consent for the research
studies is unclear. As discussed in Section I.C.2, the Common Rule lists
the information that must or should be provided to a research subject as
part of obtaining informed consent. However, as also discussed in that
Section, obtaining a signed consent form does not mean that informed
consent was actually obtained. Instead, informed consent is a process that
ensures that the research subject can make an informed decision
reasonably free of coercion and duress.149
As discussed above, nearly all (if not all) of the studies utilizing NFL
Combine participants as research subjects were IRB-approved.
Additionally, as discussed above, most of the studies likely do not meet
the requirements permitting waiver or alteration of informed consent.
Consequently, it seems highly likely that the researchers created and had
players sign consent forms that included the information required by the
Common Rule. Only six studies mention having obtained consent from the
participants.150 However, even among these studies, the sufficiency of the
consent is unclear. Two studies rely on consent forms executed by the
players for purposes of being evaluated at the Combine, but not for the
research specifically.151 Additionally, two of the studies state that “[a]ll
players signed a consent form allowing use of their data by teams for the
annual Draft and also for research purposes.”152
In fact, as discussed earlier, Combine participants execute broad
waivers concerning the use of their medical information.153 One of the
waivers provides that the player is authorizing the disclosure of his
medical records for purposes relating to, among other things, “NFL player
health and safety initiatives and projects, in accordance with the August 4,
2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement and amendments to it, including
149. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2).
150. See infra Appendix A, studies 3, 22, 24–25, 31, 40.
151. See Lee D. Kaplan et al., Incidence and Variance of Foot and Ankle Injuries in
Elite College Football Players, 40 AM. J. ORTHOPEDICS 40, 41 (2011) (“All players
attended [the 2006 Combine] voluntarily and provided written consent to be evaluated.”);
Lee D. Kaplan et al., Prevalence and Variance of Shoulder Injuries in Elite Collegiate
Football Players, 33 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 1142, 1143 (2005) (“All players attended [the
2004 Combine] voluntarily and signed waivers for their evaluation.”).
152. See John E. Zvijac et al., Isokinetic Concentric Quadriceps and Hamstring
Normative Data for Elite Collegiate American Football Players Participating in the NFL
Scouting Combine, 28 J. STRENGTH & CONDITIONING RES. 875, 877 (2014); John E. Zvijac
et al., Isokinetic Concentric Quadriceps and Hamstring Strength Variables From the NFL
Scouting Combine Are Not Predictive of Hamstring Injury in First-Year Professional
Football Players, 41 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 1511, 1512 (2013).
153. See supra notes 112 and accompanying text.
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without limitation the Side Letter Agreement regarding the Injury
Surveillance System and Player Health Information Analysis,
Dissemination and Research, dated December 2014 . . . .”154 This
provision suggests that there is an agreement between the NFL and
NFLPA about the use of Combine participant medical information, and
that that agreement permits the information to be used for research
purposes. Neither the NFL nor NFLPA responded to my requests for a
copy of this side letter. All the same, as discussed above, the NFLPA
cannot negotiate on behalf of Combine participants. Thus, the
enforceability of any such agreement as it applies to Combine participants
is dubious.
Additionally, these waivers are terribly vague. The waivers do not
provide any of the numerous pieces of information required of the
Common Rule,155 including but not limited to “an explanation of the
purposes of the research,” “[a] description of any reasonably foreseeable
risks or discomforts,” or “[a] statement that participation is voluntary.”156
More broadly, as required by the newer version of the Common Rule, no
reasonable person could argue that the waiver provides “[t]he prospective
subject . . . with the information that a reasonable person would want to
have in order to make an informed decision about whether to participate,
and an opportunity to discuss that information.”157 Simply put, these
waivers do not provide the meaningful informed consent required by the
Common Rule.
Importantly, the waivers would not have to provide the information
described above if the research were secondary research exempt from the
Common Rule. However, for reasons discussed above in Section III.C,
that does not appear to be the case for many studies.
In the absence of a universal waiver that the NFL, its clubs and their
doctors have tried to impose upon Combine participants, it seems very
unlikely that players would carefully read and consider consent forms
from multiple studies. For example, 17 of the studies utilize data from the
2015 NFL Combine. It is difficult to imagine that a 2015 NFL Combine
participant carefully reviewed 17 different consent forms in addition to the
various other documents and pieces of information presented to them at
the Combine.
At this point, pausing and looking forward is useful. Above is an
explanation of why the existing NFL Combine waivers were likely not
sufficient to establish informed consent under the Common Rule.

154.
155.
156.
157.

See Roberts et al., supra note 108, online app. C.
See supra notes 147 and accompanying text.
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b) (West 2018).
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(4).
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Nevertheless, the revised Common Rule likely makes things easier for the
NFL, its clubs and related researchers. As discussed in Section I.C.1, the
revised Common Rule codifies a “broad consent” process through which
a research subject can consent to the data, information or biospecimens
gathered as part of an initial study to be used in a subsequent study
provided the data, information or biospecimens are de-identified. The
studies discussed herein all rely on the same principal data source—the
NFL Combine database. Moreover, there is considerable overlap in the coauthors. Thus, a future in which researchers could obtain consent for one
study and then thereafter fairly easily conduct other studies with deidentified data is possible.
Nevertheless, until players provide informed consent to even one
study, it is debatable whether NFL Combine participants have previously
executed the waivers provided to them free of coercion or undue influence.
As discussed above, the definitions of coercion and undue influence are
slightly amorphous among the bioethical and legal literature.158
Nevertheless, the literature identifies as troubling circumstances where the
research subject faces a “worse consequence,” “unfair persuasion,” or
“economic force[s]” that compel the subject’s participation.159 Moreover,
OHRP identified an “implicit” threat of harm as being coercive. 160
NFL Combine participants have a significantly constrained choice
about whether to participate in much of the research being conducted. As
discussed above, the NFL Combine is generally considered the “biggest
job interview” of these young men’s lives.161 Approximately 300 players
attend the NFL Combine,162 competing amongst each other and with
players not invited to the Combine for approximately 255 spots in the NFL
Draft.
The medical exams conducted at the Combine—and which are the
empirical basis for the research discussed in this Article—provide a useful
comparator. As discussed above, the medical examinations, according to
the clubs, are crucial to their evaluation of players.163 According to Jeff
Foster, President of the organization that hosts the NFL Combine, skipping
a medical test could serve as “red flag” to NFL clubs “and would not be
good for the player.”164 Indeed, Foster explained that “‘if you’re not going
to participate [in the medical exams], there’s no reason to be’” at the

158. See supra note 72-79 and accompanying text.
159. See id.
160. Informed Consent FAQs, supra note 67.
161. See Bhanpuri et al., supra note 96.
162. Roberts et al., supra note 108, at 235.
163. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
164. Rick Maese, The NFL Combine: Pro football’s intrusive and compulsory, job
interview, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2017), https://wapo.st/2Pb7By3.
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Combine.165 Given the pressure to impress clubs, there can be no doubt
that NFL Combine participants are reluctant to do anything that might
negatively affect their hopes of being drafted and having a career in the
NFL. There is certainly a strong “implicit” threat that if a player does not
cooperate, he will suffer adverse employment consequences.
Consequently, it seems very unlikely that any player has refused to
participate in the medical exams.
Combine participants likely feel similar pressure to consent to
medical research. The request for cooperation is coming from the same
source—NFL club medical personnel. While the club medical personnel
are likely more interested in the player’s medical examination than his
consent to participate in research, there is little difference to the player—
they do not want to disappoint or anger an NFL club.
Given the pressures involved, it seems very unlikely that a player
would not sign whatever consent or waiver form presented to them at the
Combine—whether for a medical exam or for research. In this respect, the
waivers are contracts of adhesion—a “standard-form contract prepared by
one party, to be signed by another party in a weaker position.”166 Via
email, I asked Foster whether, to his knowledge, any NFL Combine
participant had ever refused to sign a waiver requested of him;167 he did
not respond.
Moreover, bioethics experts have questioned the voluntariness of
health waivers used by professional sports organizations. Kartina Karkazis
and Jennifer R. Fishman argued that athletes are effectively “coerc[ed]”
into executing such waivers “because of concerns about keeping a job,
renewing a contract, or simply getting playing time.”168 Similarly, Mark
A. Rothstein argues that such “waivers are unethical,” because
“[i]ndividual players have no choice but to sign a waiver, and thus they
are inherently coercive.”169 While these comments were not addressed
specifically at the waiver or consent forms used for the research studies,
as discussed above, the contexts are substantially similar.
OHRP has specifically recognized that “when employees are the
subjects of research”:
investigators and IRBs must be cautious about the potential for
coercion and undue influence and the need to protect confidentiality.
165. Id.
166. Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
167. E-mail from author to Jeff Foster, President of National Football Scouting (June
18, 2018) (on file with author).
168. Katrina Karkazis & Jennifer R. Fishman, Tracking U.S. Professional Athletes: The
Ethics of Biometric Technologies, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan. 2017, at 45, 56.
169. Mark A. Rothstein, Commentary, Preventing Conflicts of Interest of NFL Team
Physicians, HASTINGS CTR. REP. (SPECIAL ISSUE), Nov.-Dec. 2016, at S35, S36.
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Employee participation raises questions about the ability of employees
to exercise free choice, for example, because of the possibility that a
decision to participate could affect performance evaluations or job
advancement, even if it is only the employee’s perception that this is
the case . . . . Employees are likely to view their employers as authority
figures to whom they must show deference, which could undermine
the freedom of their choice.170

Although Combine participants are not yet employees of NFL clubs,
the same concerns exist. Indeed, the fact that they are not yet employees
heightens the concerns of coercion and undue influence, since the
Combine participants are seeking a job they do not yet have.
In another analogous setting, OHRP recognizes the risks of coercion
or undue influence “when students are involved in research in a college or
university setting.”171 OHRP “recommends that institutions have policies
in place that clarify for students and faculty that any participation of
students in research must be voluntary.”172 Moreover, according to OHRP,
“some research institutions use a so-called ‘student subject pool’ to
identify students who might be willing to participate in research, even
when the exact nature of the research to be conducted has not yet been
determined.”173 Importantly, “[s]tudents who sign up for such pools have
not legally consented to participate in a research study since they have not
been provided with sufficient information concerning the exact study in
which they would participate.”174 Student subject pools thus bear
considerable resemblance to NFL Combine participants. In both cases, the
research participants have positioned themselves to potentially be included
in a research study. Nevertheless, informed consent cannot be obtained
until they are provided with the appropriate information concerning the
exact study in which they might participate.175
Lastly, the consent process is all the more suspect given the strong
argument that NFL Combine participants should be considered vulnerable
research subjects, a possibility discussed next.
G.

Should NFL Combine Participants Be Considered a
Vulnerable Population?

As mentioned earlier in Section III.C.1, the Common Rule requires
that “[w]hen some or all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to
170. Informed Consent FAQs, supra note 67.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Relatedly, OHRP also instructs that “[e]nsuring an adequate consent . . . process
may require repeating or supplementing the initial consent procedure.” Id.
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coercion or undue influence, such as children, prisoners, individuals with
impaired decision-making capacity, or economically or educationally
disadvantaged persons, additional safeguards [must be] included in the
study to protect the rights and welfare of these subjects.”176
NFL Combine participants are clearly not explicitly identified in that
list. Nevertheless, the “[t]he words ‘such as’ suggest that these groups are
simply examples of vulnerable populations, rather than an exhaustive
list.”177 Academics in the field have recognized that “vulnerability is an
elusive concept,”178 but one that should be given “the most expansive
construction.”179
Various expert organizations have proffered guidelines to help assess
whether a population is vulnerable within the context of human subjects
research. The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences
(CIOMS) identified vulnerable persons “a[s] those who are relatively (or
absolutely) incapable of protecting their own interests. More formally,
they may have insufficient power, intelligence, education, resources,
strength, or other needed attributes to protect their own interests.”180
CIOMS further explained that “[t]he quality of the consent of prospective
subjects who are junior or subordinate members of a hierarchal group
requires careful consideration, as their agreement to volunteer may be
unduly influenced . . . by the expectation of preferential treatment if they
agree or by fear of disapproval or retaliation if they refuse.”181 The
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, an advisory
panel within the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, defines
vulnerability in substantially the same way.182
Without examining all of the factors that might be considered in
determining whether a population should be considered vulnerable, this
Section focuses on two factors that support the position that NFL Combine
participants should be considered vulnerable for purposes of human
subjects research: (1) Combine participants’ economic status; and (2) an
inequity in power between a player-participant and NFL clubs. In closing,
this Section analogizes the situation of NFL Combine participants with
176. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b) (West 2018).
177. Carl H. Coleman, Vulnerability as a Regulatory Category in Human Subject
Research, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 12, 12 (2009).
178. Efthimios Parasidis, The Military Biomedical Complex: Are Service Members A
Vulnerable Population?, 16 HOUS. J. HEALTH L & POL’Y 113, 114 (2016).
179. Id. at 156.
180. INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN SUBJECTS, COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORGS. OF MED. SCI. Guideline 13 cmt. (2002),
http://bit.ly/2DjWCvW [hereinafter INT’L ETHICAL GUIDELINES].
181. Id.
182. See VULNERABLE POPULATIONS BACKGROUND, PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE
STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES 2 (2016), http://bit.ly/2AM1Eid [hereinafter VULNERABLE
POPULATIONS].
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another population generally considered to be vulnerable for purposes of
human subjects research—military service members.
It is well recognized that lower income individuals should generally
be considered a vulnerable population for human subjects research.183
“Individuals with limited resources might be vulnerable to exploitation in
clinical research if researchers take advantage of their poor socioeconomic
circumstances by offering unfair benefits in relation to the burdens of a
study, or if individuals perceive that they have no choice but to
participate.”184 Such situations create the risk that the study participant is
being taken advantage of, or being used merely as a “means for the ends
of others.”185 While NFL Combine participants might one day make
millions of dollars, at the time of the Combine they have not yet made a
single dollar from playing football (provided they abided by NCAA rules).
Research has found that “over one-half” of black Division I college
football players come from low socioeconomic backgrounds,186 and from
hometowns that are more “socioeconomically disadvantaged” than the
national average.187 There is also considerable research about the
importance of a career in sports for black men, for whom fewer resources
and opportunities limit their upward mobility.188 With this background, it
is clear that a significant portion of NFL Combine participants189 will feel
pressure to comply with the requests of NFL club and Combine personnel,
or risk losing a tremendous opportunity for a lucrative career.
The limited financial resources and opportunities for many NFL
Combine participants leads to the next consideration in finding the
population to be vulnerable: the inequity in power between the playerparticipants and NFL clubs. While the above medical studies may lead to
better treatment methods for NFL players in the future, they are also
largely devoted to player evaluation on behalf of NFL clubs. The doctors
performing the Combine medical exams—and publishing the studies—are
doing so principally to help NFL clubs, not players. As discussed above,
183. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b) (West 2018); see also Christine Grady, Vulnerability in
Research: Individuals with Limited Financial and/or Social Resources, 37 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 19, 19 (2009).
184. Grady, supra note 183, at 21.
185. Id. at 23.
186. Komanduri S. Murty et al., Race and Class Exploitation: A Study of Black Male
Student Athletes (BSAs) on White Campuses, 21 RACE, GENDER & CLASS, nos. 3–4, 2014,
at 156, 156.
187. Rachel Allison et al., A Comparison of Hometown Socioeconomics and
Demographics for Black and White Elite Football Players in the U.S., 53 INT’L REV. FOR
THE SOC. OF SPORT 615, 615 (2018).
188. See id. at 616–19, 25.
189. In 2017, 69.7% of NFL players were black. Richard Lapchick & Saahil Marfatia,
The 2017 Racial and Gender Report Card: National Football League, INST. FOR DIVERSITY
AND ETHICS IN SPORT 5 (Oct. 18, 2017), http://bit.ly/2F0ywrF.
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24 of the studies compared players’ Combine medical records against their
performance or longevity in the NFL.190 Moreover, as discussed above in
Section III.E, NFL Combine participants are extremely unlikely to resist
research requests, for fear of irritating the NFL clubs that want the research
data. Such situations present a problem of “deferential vulnerability,”
where prospective participants “have the cognitive capacity to consent but
are subject to the authority of others who might have independent interests
in whether the prospective participant agrees to enroll in the research
study.”191 As a result, there can be problematic and “inequitable
distributions of the burdens and benefits of research.”192
This inequity in power leads to a final consideration in evaluating
NFL Combine participants as a vulnerable research population—their
similarity to military service members. Professor Efthimios Parasidis of
The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law has persuasively made
the case that service members should be considered a vulnerable research
population.193 Professor Parasidis’s argument is based on six factors: (1) a
military command structure in which a subordinate officer must obey a
lawful order of a superior officer; (2) a nebulous boundary between
treatment and research in military settings; (3) liberal use of waivers
waiving informed consent; (4) a military culture which stresses
conformity; (5) the priority of the health of the group over that of the
individual; and (6) governmental immunities and limitations on tort claims
by military personnel.194 All of these factors—except the sixth—are also
present in the NFL workplace (including at the NFL Combine), as will be
elaborated on below.
There is a long history of players, coaches, fans, media and others
analogizing the physical and strategic nature of football with that of war.195
A list of famous quotes from legendary coach Vince Lombardi repeatedly
mentions “battle” and “war.”196 These comparisons have rightly drawn

190. See infra Appendix A, studies 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26,
27, 32, 33, 35, 36, 38.
191. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, 1 REPORT ON ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES
IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS (2016), https://bit.ly/2qfUL2Q.
192. INT’L ETHICAL GUIDELINES, supra note 180, Guideline 13 cmt.
193. See generally Parasidis, supra note 178.
194. Id. at 131–51.
195. See generally Shaun Scott, How the NFL sells (and profits from) the inextricable
link between football and war, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 9, 2016),
https://perma.cc/K4LT-S2HM; Tricia Jenkins, The Militarization of American
Professional Sports: How the Sports-War Intertext Influences Athletic Ritual and Sports
Media, 37 J. OF SPORT & SOCIAL ISSUES 245 (2013); LZ Granderson, Sports teams are not
at war, ESPN (Oct. 31, 2010), https://perma.cc/3M9C-YCGV.
196. See Famous Quotes by Vince Lombardi, VINCELOMBARDI.COM,
https://perma.cc/5T8Z-XKBR (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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criticism197—as the playing of a sport for considerable economic gain
should not rightfully be likened to facing life and death situations in
service of your country. Nevertheless, there are substantial similarities
between the cultures relevant to the vulnerability analysis.
The Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues aptly
summarized the challenging environment in the military:
Military personnel also might feel pressure to participate in research
because of the structured hierarchy in which they live and work. They
might feel that participation could contribute to promotions, easier
assignments, or special privileges; or that refusal to participate could
result in demotions or other punitive measures. Moreover, the success
of military operations depends in part on giving up some individual
autonomy for the good of the whole; for this reason, soldiers might be
coerced to participate in research if it is considered to be for the greater
good; for example, accepting an experimental vaccine to ensure that
the entire force would be protected.198

Now consider the below description of the NFL workplace by former
NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue, while serving as an arbitrator in a
2012 case in which New Orleans Saints players199 faced potential
discipline for allegedly participating in a program created by coaches that
offered financial rewards for big plays and injuries to opponents:
In determining player discipline for involvement in performance pools
- - whatever form they may take - - that are developed, encouraged and
managed by coaches, the coach-player relationship is also material.
NFL players on average have short careers; their careers can end
suddenly through injury or declining skills; players want to be good,
cohesive members of the team, or unit, not complainers or dissenters;
and players accept that they work for coaches, in “programs”
conceived by coaches. . . .
In such circumstances, players may not have much choice but to “go
along,” to comply with coaching demands or directions that they may
question or resent. They may know - - or believe - - that from the
coaches’ perspective, “it’s my way or the highway.” Coaching legends
such as George Halas and Vince Lombardi are not glorified or
remembered because they offered players “freedom of choice.”
While more recent and current coaches may debate whether and how
much coaching approaches to “do it my way” have changed over time,

197. See sources cited supra note 195.
198. VULNERABLE POPULATIONS, supra note 182, at 11.
199. My law firm at the time, Peter R. Ginsberg Law, LLC., represented one of the
Saints’ players in this matter.
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it is clear that directions such as those given by the Saints’ coaches in
creating the Program are usually followed by most players. NFL head
coaches told me in my seventeen years as Commissioner, “If players
don’t do it our way, they can find another team to pay them.”200

The similarities are considerable. In both the military and the NFL,
the personnel are under tremendous pressure to obey the orders of their
superiors and sacrifice themselves for the betterment of the organization.
If they fail to do so, they will suffer serious consequences. Admittedly, the
consequences at stake are disparate. In the NFL, a player’s noncompliance could result in the loss of his job or career. In the military,
non-compliance can lead to court martial and imprisonment.201 Without
diminishing the pressures faced by military members, I nonetheless
believe the culture of the NFL is sufficiently similar to learn from special
considerations that may be given to military members.
Returning to the factors outlined by Professor Parasidis in support of
categorizing military personnel as vulnerable, the above descriptions
demonstrate the similarity between the NFL and the military as to three of
them: the command structure; a culture of conformity; and the priority of
the health of the group over that of the individual.
A fourth factor identified by Professor Parasidis is also relevant in
the NFL context—a nebulous boundary between treatment and research.
Club doctors are hired, paid, and reviewed by the clubs.202 The doctors
then examine players for, at least in part, the purpose of providing the club
with information concerning the health status of players for both shortterm and long-term purposes.203 At the same time, club doctors are
obligated by the CBA and codes of ethics to provide medical care that
prioritizes the players’ interests.204 The club doctors’ dual roles is a
structural conflict of interest that can cause confusion and concern.205
While these characteristics describe the situation for players already in the
NFL—as opposed to those at the NFL Combine—the environment is still
very similar. The purposes of the medical exams at the NFL Combine
might not always be clear to the players. On the one hand, the doctor might
examine the player and make a diagnosis meaningful to the player’s
health. On the other hand, the doctor is also making note of any medical
200. In the Matter of New Orleans Saints Pay-for-Performance/”Bounty” (Dec. 11,
2012) (Tagliabue, Arb.), https://bit.ly/1HWgk7g (“it is clear that [the player] was under
tremendous pressure to follow the chain of command in order to keep his job.”).
201. See 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
202. See I. Glenn Cohen et al., A Proposal to Address NFL Club Doctors’ Conflicts of
Interest and to Promote Player Trust, HASTINGS CTR. REP. (SPECIAL ISSUE), Nov.-Dec.
2016, at S2, S14 (2016).
203. See id. at S13, S17.
204. See id. at S9–S10.
205. See id. at S6–S13.
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concerns that might affect the player’s usefulness to NFL clubs. Such an
environment blurs the boundaries between medical care and analysis or
research for other purposes.
Lastly, Professor Parasidis identified the liberal use of waivers as
supporting a finding of vulnerability. As explained above, NFL Combine
participants execute broad waivers permitting their medical information to
be shared with the NFL, NFL clubs and related parties.206 This process is
repeated once players are in the NFL and, according to one current player,
no one refuses to sign the waivers: “it’s you sign this and you play football
or you don’t sign it and you don’t, everybody signs it. I don’t know
anybody who hasn’t.”207
In sum, NFL Combine participants are strongly deserving of
consideration as a vulnerable population for human subjects research in
light of their socioeconomic demographics and the disparity in power
between themselves and those supporting and conducting the research.
Finally, the considerable similarities between Combine participants and
military personnel—a population often considered vulnerable for research
purposes—further supports a finding that Combine participants merit
additional protections and considerations when subjects of research.
***
With the above understanding of how the Common Rule applies to
research conducted on NFL Combine participants, and how at times such
research might not comply with the Common Rule, in Part IV I discuss
ways in which NFL players can be better protected when they are human
subjects research participants.
V.

PROTECTING NFL COMBINE PARTICIPANTS MOVING
FORWARD

Above, a number of uncertainties concerning the potential
application of the Common Rule to the studies discussed herein are
highlighted. It is possible that many (if not most) of the studies complied
with the Common Rule or perhaps were even exempt in various ways.
Nevertheless, from what is known, there are still ethical concerns related
to research involving NFL Combine participants, particularly concerning
the informed consent process.

206. See supra notes 112 and surrounding text.
207. DEUBERT ET AL., supra note 111; see also Karkazis & Fishman, supra note 168,
at 51 (“one [NBA] team lawyer noted that he had never heard of a player not signing” a
health information authorization).
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Protecting future NFL Combine participants in the context of medical
research might be achieved in two ways: (1) seeking to enforce the
participants’ existing rights; and (2) improving the process through which
players consent to and participate in such research.
A.

Players’ Enforcement Options

Unfortunately, players who might believe that they participated in
research that did not comply with the Common Rule do not have
meaningful recourse. First, the Common Rule does not create a private
cause of action, meaning human subjects research participants cannot sue
to enforce the Common Rule or obtain damages for a party’s failure to
comply with it.208 Second, while research participants can report potential
violations of the Common Rule to OHRP,209 OHRP has no authority to
compensate the participant for any harm suffered,210 particularly now that
it no longer has authority over institutions “checking the box.” With a lack
of meaningful enforcement options, it is all that more important that the
process of using Combine participants of human subjects research comply
with both the letter and spirit of the Common Rule. The next Section
recommends solutions to reach this outcome.
B.

Recommendations for An Improved Process

There have been a variety of protections implemented and
recommended for certain vulnerable groups. The Common Rule includes
specific “additional protections” for human fetuses, and neonates,211 as
well as for prisoners212 and children.213 The additional protections for
human fetuses, neonates and children are medically-driven; aimed to
protect the health of the subjects.214 The additional protections for

208. See Cabi v. Boston Children’s Hosp., 161 F. Supp. 3d 136, 155 (D. Mass. 2016);
Bilinski v. Wills Eye Hosp., 2016 WL 6247569, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Tilousi v. Arizona
State Univ., 2005 WL 6199562, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2005).
209. Submitting a complaint, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS.,
https://perma.cc/6MB9-QTUJ (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
210. See Compliance Oversight Procedures for Evaluating Institutions, OFFICE FOR
HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS. (Oct. 14, 2009), https://perma.cc/6UCQ-8NBZ (limiting
enforcement authority to requiring “corrective action” by institution).
211. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201–07 (West 2018).
212. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301–06 (West 2018).
213. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401–09 (West 2018). The former version of the Common Rule
also described “pregnant women” as vulnerable, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b) (1991) (amended
2018), and, as a result, required additional protections when they were research subjects.
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201–07. However, pregnant women were removed as category of
vulnerable research subjects to “help facilitate their inclusion in clinical trials.” Bierer et
al., supra note 4, at 787.
214. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.204–05, 46.405–06 (West 2018).
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prisoners exist out of concern that prisoners’ “incarceration . . . could
affect their ability to make a truly voluntary and uncoerced decision
whether or not to participate as subjects in research.”215
Otherwise, various bioethics committees have suggested a variety of
protections for vulnerable groups, including but not limited to selecting
participants less burdened by their circumstances, ensuring that the
research is responsive to the health needs of the population, obtaining
permission from appropriate representatives, assessing the vulnerability of
the population, and additional oversight by the IRB.216
Drawing from the Common Rule protections, others proposed for
vulnerable populations, and other safeguards occasionally required by
IRBs, there are a variety of ways in which human subjects research
utilizing NFL Combine participants can be done in a more fair and
appropriate manner.
First, the researchers and/or the Combine participants could be
required to read the consent form aloud and audio record the process. A
process whereby the subjects have more time to think about the research
rather than quickly scribbling their signature on a consent form would
certainly enhance the subjects’ decision-making power. The audio
recording merely ensures the process was completed properly. This is not
an uncommon practice and thus it is certainly possible some of the studies
discussed herein went through such a process.
Second, the NFLPA could insist upon the right to approve any
research utilizing NFL Combine participants. In fact, two studies reference
having obtained NFLPA approval.217 There is additional precedent for this
recommendation. The CBA prohibits NFL clubs from utilizing wearable
technologies worn by players “for health or medical purposes” without the
NFLPA’s consent.218 Similarly, the Accountability and Care Committee,
jointly staffed by the NFL and NFLPA, is charged with “conduct[ing]
research into prevention and treatment of illness and injury commonly
experienced by professional athletes,” and “conduct[ing] a confidential
player survey at least once every two years to solicit the players’ input and
opinion regarding the adequacy of medical care provided by their
respective medical and training staffs.”219 As explained above, the
NFLPA’s negotiation of the medical authorization forms for Combine
215. 45 C.F.R. § 46.302 (West 2018).
216. See VULNERABLE POPULATIONS, supra note 182.
217. See Brendin R. Beaulieu-Jones et al., Epidemiology of Injuries Identified at the
NFL Scouting Combine and Their Impact on Performance in the National Football League,
ORTHOPAEDIC J. SPORTS MED., July 2017, at *2 (2017); Kevin J. McHale et al.,
Epidemiology and Outcomes of Lisfranc Injuries Identified at the National Football
League Scouting Combine, 45 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 1901, 1902 (2017).
218. NFL-NFLPA CBA, supra note 113, art. 51, § 13(c).
219. Id. art. 39, § 3(c).
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participants is without legal effect since the participants are not yet within
the bargaining unit represented by the NFLPA.220 This fact raises
questions about the propriety of the NFLPA screening research conducted
on NFL Combine participants. The crucial distinction is that in negotiating
the waivers, the NFLPA is seemingly purporting to act as a representative
of the players concerning their legal rights, i.e., negotiating the disclosure
and use of player medical records. Screening research does not go that far.
The NFLPA can review and assess research studies without affecting
players’ legal rights. The NFLPA is a stakeholder on this issue and has
valuable expertise that it should exercise in support of its future members.
Third, as a proxy for the oversight provided by the NFLPA, the
consent process could require that the consent form be provided to the
Combine participants’ agent. By virtue of the National Labor Relations
Act, agents—formally known as “contract advisors”—are agents of the
NFLPA for the purposes of representing players in matters concerning
their employment.221 Rather than represent all players by itself, the
NFLPA certifies and regulates contract advisors for the purposes of
protecting and assisting NFL players.222 Thus, reviewing a consent form
for a player is within the scope of a contract advisor’s duties. Moreover,
providing the consent form to a professional who has a fiduciary obligation
to look out for the player’s best interests will help ensure that the player’s
rights and interests are being protected.223
Fourth, in reviewing research involving NFL Combine participants,
IRBs could seek out the perspective of a player, former player, or someone
sufficiently representative of their perspective. Indeed, in research
involving prisoners, “[a]t least one member of the [Institutional Review]
Board shall be a prisoner, or a prisoner representative with appropriate
background and experience to serve in that capacity.”224 Given the
unfortunate fact that there are far less current and former NFL players than
there are current or former prisoners, the IRB need not necessarily include
such an individual as a Board member. But at a minimum, the IRB should
seek out their perspective on how the research—including the consent
process—might be received by or affect the player population. To
facilitate this, it might be advisable to take advantage of a change in the
Common Rule that now permits a single IRB to review research being
conducted at multiple sites and institutions.225 A single IRB might be able
220. See supra note 113 and surrounding text.
221. See DEUBERT ET AL., supra note 111, at 304–05.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 307–08.
224. 45 C.F.R. § 46.304(b) (West 2018).
225. See Single IRB Policy for Multi-site Research, NAT’L INSTS.
https://perma.cc/PZ3Q-5LD2 (last visited Mar. 15, 2019).
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to develop the necessary expertise—while taking into account the various
concerns discussed herein—to ensure the research is conducted
appropriately and effectively.
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, the IRB should require that the
Combine participants’ decision whether or not to participate in the medical
research remain confidential. It is of course common for the identity of
research subjects to remain confidential. However, the risks of disclosure
are particularly serious here where a player could suffer serious adverse
employment action as a result of his refusal to participate in a research
study. That risk is compounded by the fact that the research studies are
being conducted by doctors and athletic trainers affiliated with NFL clubs.
Those doctors and athletic trainers provide advice to clubs about potential
draftees. If those doctors or athletic trainers have a negative experience
with the player as a result of a player’s refusal to participate in a research
study, that could negatively affect the doctor or athletic trainer’s opinion
of the player and thus also the player’s Draft status. Appropriate
safeguards and firewalls are necessary to ensure that the NFL and NFL
clubs cannot learn the identities of players who refused to participate in
medical research requested of them. For example, it would likely be best
that medical personnel affiliated with the NFL or an NFL club not be
involved in any way in the consent process and only review de-identified
research data.
These recommendations do not suggest that federal regulations
concerning the NFL Combine are needed. Rather, these are
recommendations best considered by the IRBs overseeing studies with
NFL Combine participants as subjects.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Medical personnel for NFL clubs are often leading experts in their
field. Nevertheless, they also work in an environment in which their
loyalties and duties are divided between players and the clubs. The
medical studies discussed in this Article are further evidence of this
conflict. These research studies, which were overwhelmingly run by NFL
club medical personnel, generally analyze NFL Combine participant
medical information for the principal purpose of being able to better
evaluate the usefulness of those players to NFL clubs. In the process, the
players’ rights and interests are subordinated. This is unacceptable. Given
that the structure of NFL club medical staffs is unlikely to change anytime
soon,226 other options and authorities must be considered in protecting

226. See Letter from Jeffrey A. Miller, Executive Vice President of Health & Safety
Initiatives, NFL, to Christopher R. Deubert, I. Glenn Cohen, & Holly Fernandez Lynch
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players. In this specific context, IRBs have the potential to ensure that NFL
Combine participants are being subjected to research in the dignified and
respectful matter required by the Common Rule.

10–14 (Nov. 1, 2016), https://bit.ly/2RneYzj (denying conflict of interest in structure of
NFL club medical care).
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APPENDIX A – MEDICAL STUDIES UTILIZING DATA COLLECTED AT THE
NFL COMBINE
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